The stereotypical view of computing, and hence computer
security, is a landscape filled with laptops, desktops, smartphones
and servers; general purpose computers in the proper sense. However,
this is but the visible tip of the iceberg. In fact, most computing
today is invisibly embedded into systems and environments that few of
us would ever think of as computers. Indeed, applications in
virtually all walks of modern life, from automobiles to medical
devices, power grids to voting machines, have evolved to rely on the
same substrate of general purpose microprocessors and (frequently)
network connectivity that underlie our personal computers. Yet along
with the power of these capabilities come the same potential risks as
well. My research has focused on understanding the scope of such
problems by exploring vulnerabilities in the embedded environment, how
they arise, and the shape of the attack surfaces they expose. In
this talk, I will particularly discuss recent work on two large-scale
platforms: modern automobiles and electronic voting machines. In each
case, I will explain how implicit or explicit assumptions in the
design of the systems have opened them to attack. I will demonstrate
these problems, concretely and completely, including arbitrary control
over election results and remote tracking and control of an unmodified
automobile. I will explain the nature of these problems, how they
have come to arise, and the challenges in hardening such systems going
forward.