Multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic primitive that allows multiple parties to perform computation on their joint inputs while ensuring that no party's input is revealed. MPC protocols play a crucial role in various privacy-preserving applications. However, existing protocols are not efficient enough for real-life applications, preventing MPC to be extensively used in our daily life.
I propose to design new protocols for MPC with high efficiency and strong security. I begin by my previous work that introduces a new protocol for secure two-party computation. The protocol is secure against active adversaries who can behave arbitrarily. Its efficiency is similar to the efficiency of protocols secure against semi-honest adversaries, which is a weaker model where adversaries are restricted to behave as described by the protocol.
In my proposed work, I will extend the protocol in the multi-party setting. The proposed protocol enjoys high efficiency and performance, and allows at most all but one parties to be controlled by active adversaries.
Chair: Dr. Jonathan Katz
Dept rep: Dr. Michelle Mazurek
Member: Dr. Dana Dachman-Soled