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Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes
Daniel Apon - NIST
Friday, October 26, 2018, 1:00-2:00 pm Calendar
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Abstract

This talk will survey the "QMAC" paper by Boneh-Zhandry at Eurocrypt 2013. Their paper's abstract is as follows:

We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security.

The only "quantum" background assumed will be those ideas covered in Gorjan's "Intro to Quantum" talk at CRG two weeks prior (on Oct 12).

This talk is organized by Huijing Gong