Abstractions have proven essential for us to manage computing systems that are constantly growing in size and complexity. However, as core design primitives are obscured, these abstractions can engender new security challenges. My research investigates these abstractions and the underlying core functionalities to identify the implicit flow violations in modern computing systems. 

In this talk, I will detail my efforts in characterizing flow violations, investigating attacks leveraging them, and defending against the attacks. I will first describe how the “stateless” abstraction of serverless computing platforms masks a reality in which functions are cached in memory for long periods of time, enabling attackers to gain quasi-persistence and how such attacks can be investigated through building serverless-aware provenance collection mechanisms. Then I will further discuss how IoT automation platforms abstract the underlying information flows among rules installed within a smart home. I will present my findings on modeling and discovering inter-rule flow violations through building an information flow graph for smart homes. These efforts demonstrate how practical and widely deployable secure systems can be built through understanding the requirements of systems as well as identifying the root cause of violations of these requirements.