log in  |  register  |  feedback?  |  help  |  web accessibility
Logo
Normal-Form Games at Scale
Tuesday, October 17, 2023, 1:00-2:00 pm Calendar
  • You are subscribed to this talk through .
  • You are watching this talk through .
  • You are subscribed to this talk. (unsubscribe, watch)
  • You are watching this talk. (unwatch, subscribe)
  • You are not subscribed to this talk. (watch, subscribe)
Registration requested: The organizer of this talk requests that you register if you are planning to attend. There are two ways to register: (1) You can create an account on this site (click the "register" link in the upper-right corner) and then register for this talk; or (2) You can enter your details below and click the "Register for talk" button. Either way, you can always cancel your registration later.

Name:
Email:
Organization:

Abstract

Normal-form Games (NFGs) are the backbone of game theory. They are well-studied and have established solution concepts such as Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria. Traditionally, research has focused on solving NFGs precisely, one at a time, with iterative solvers. Recent work attempts to solve these games using paradigms suitable for machine learning: quickly and approximately, with function approximation. This talk will be split into two sections, first I will establish some useful properties of NFGs that can be exploited in a machine learning context: an equilibrium-invariant embedding for NFGs which simplifies representation and sampling. Secondly I will describe a neural network architecture for very quickly computing (C)CEs in n-player general-sum games. Finally, I will explain why solving NFGs at scale could be an important component in solving temporal game formulations like Markov Games at scale, in a principled manner.

Bio

Luke is a Research Engineer at DeepMind and a PhD candidate at University College London. He is interested in developing principled, general, and scalable multi-agent learning algorithms, where a) principled means game theoretic, perhaps with convergence proofs, unique solutions, or involving solution concepts, b) general means n-player and general-sum, and c) scalable means, largish number of players, tractable in complex domains, extensive-form, partially observed, and can leverage RL and function approximation. Luke's favourite solution concepts are correlated equilibria and coarse-correlated equilibria. Some previous work includes Capture the FlagJoint Policy-Space Response OraclesNeural Equilibrium Solvers, and Normal-Form Game Embeddings.

 

Note: Please register using the Google Form on our website https://go.umd.edu/marl for access to the Google Meet and talk resources.

This talk is organized by Saptarashmi Bandyopadhyay